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Alison Kimble ‘11 – Humanities 
 
A Secular Examination of the Moral Difference between Humans and Animals 
 
Introduction 
Human and non-human animals’ (henceforth referred to as animals) interests come into 
conflict every day. It is a common intuition that when given a choice between the wellbeing of a 
human and the wellbeing of an animal, it is morally imperative to prefer the human over the 
animal. How can we justify our intuition that we should subordinate animal interests to human 
interests?  
There are many accounts of the moral difference between humans and animals that 
attempt to justify our intuition. They identify various grounds for preferring interests, and tie 
them to the moral value of a being, the weight of a being’s interests, and what a being is owed: 
duties and rights. Once the difference in moral value, weight of interests, duties, or rights 
between humans and animals is clear, our preference for human interests can be vindicated.1  
A plausible account must be able to demonstrate that, as our intuition tells us, the basic2 
interests of an animal are subordinate to the basic interests of a human. Pitting non-basic human 
interests against basic animal interests would be jumping the gun; until we have determined the 
difference between an animal and a human in a contest for a prize which is of huge importance, 
we cannot move on to more complicated cases, such as the basic interests of an entire species 
pitted against those of a few humans, or the non-basic interests of a human against the basic 
interests of an animal. Therefore, I will only test accounts of human superiority with cases where 
basic interests come into direct conflict. If a moral theory can tell us why we should prefer the 
basic interests of any individual human against the basic interests any individual animal, it has 
justified our intuition.    
Most theories utilize some property which most humans possess, and all animals lack, to 
explain the moral difference between them. But we can easily imagine a case in which all 
potentially relevant features (cognitively ability, moral understanding, utility etc.) of a human 
and an animal are equivalent. There are many humans that are on par with animals in a range of 
mental capacities, such as dementia patients, babies, and those suffering brain injuries. The same 
is true for emotional capacities, moral understanding, and being a member of a moral 
community: psychotic people do not feel for others, and there are isolated individuals lost to 
human society. For simplicity, we can call all of these humans “marginal cases”. 
The general problem accounts face is inconsistency: they claim we can accord marginal 
cases human moral status and give animals less moral weight, even when the two groups possess 
the relevant properties in equal measure. Peter Singer, an animal liberationist3, believes that this 
                                                
1 Whatever rights, duties, or moral consideration we determine that individual humans deserve is not the 
matter under discussion; what I am concerned with is the alleged difference between the rights and moral 
status of animals in comparison with humans. An inegalitarian view of human moral worth would be fine, 
as long as it still results in all humans being more morally weighty than all animals. There must be a clear 
reason why all humans warrant a level of worth that animals do not. My project is to determine if there is 
any good reason for the moral subjugation of all animals to all humans.  
2 Basic interests are those which are related directly to survival: food, water, safety, shelter, health etc. 
Non-basic interests are more frivolous, such as getting your dream job, or attending a concert.   
3A term for the movement to increase awareness of the true moral worth of animals, which liberationists 
believe is higher than that which we accord them now. 
1
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inconsistency is an expression of our “speciesism,” that is, our desire to prefer the interests of 
humans and grant them a particular moral status merely due to their species. It is not enough to 
say that all humans have greater moral worth simply because they are members of the human 
species, any more than it is permissible to base moral status on membership in a certain race or 
gender.4  
Therefore, an account must do two things: it must give us a basis for our intuition, and it 
must avoid inconsistency in cases involving marginal humans. In other words, a moral theory 
must describe how, generally, we can prefer the basic interests of a human to those of an animal, 
and specifically, how we prefer the interests of a marginal human to those of an equally capable 
animal. With these two questions answered, the account will successfully explain the moral 
difference between all humans and all animals.  
Why is it imperative that we prove that we can prefer the basic interests of all humans to 
those of all animals? Shouldn’t we be satisfied with a moral theory that justifies choosing the 
basic interests of most humans over those of most animals? No. Because of our harsh treatment 
of animals, it is imperative that we fully justify it. We use animals for experiments, food, 
clothing, and labor.5 We cull animals as we see fit, and eradicate species in the pursuit of natural 
resources. If we determine that we cannot describe a difference between all humans and all 
animals, then we ought to drastically change our behavior in one of two ways: we either ought to 
treat some animals as we do humans, or treat some humans as we do animals. This could mean 
that we can go to a mental hospital and start giving the patients cancer in order to test the newest 
drugs, or that we should immediately stop doing such tests on apes. Doing either, or neither, is a 
morally weighty decision.   
The specific accounts I will examine here are the personhood account, the utilitarian 
account, and the rights-based account6. I claim that though the first two theories account for our 
intuition, they fail to address, much less solve, the inconsistency of cases involving marginals. In 
the rights-based account, Carl Cohen directly proposes a solution to the case of marginals, the 
Argument from Kinds. Nonetheless, there are significant problems with his attempted solution. I 
posit that these central theories which attempt to verify our intuition are insufficient.7 
However, I do believe that there is a justification for our intuition concerning humans and 
animals. I will demonstrate how Rawls social contract theory can provide a consistent account in 
which all humans are direct recipients of justice and duties, while animals are only indirect 
recipients. This difference leads to a consistent preference for the basic interests of all humans 
over the basic interests of all animals.  
 
The Personhood Account 
The personhood account claims that moral worth is determined by a being’s personhood. 
“Personhood” refers to a set of capacities -- self-consciousness, a self-concept, abstraction and 
                                                
4 Singer, Peter. "A Utilitarian Defense of Animal Liberation." Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory 
and Application. By Louis P. Pojman and Paul Pojman. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008. 
5 Note that I am not claiming that any of these practices are what we should be doing even if animals are 
morally subordinate to humans. I will not be discussing the appropriate conduct toward animals, only how 
we justify conduct being different for animals.  
6 I am not examining the correct way to determine the moral value of a being. Again, I am looking at the 
ways in which philosophers differentiate between humans and animals in their moral theories. 
7 I am not trying to say that these theories are incorrect methods of determining moral worth, only that 
they do not justify the stark separation between our treatment of humans and animals. 
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time perception, rationality, ability to act on principle, etc.”8 These capacities are relevant to a 
being’s moral status because a person can expect a higher quality of life, which is “richer, more 
comprehensive, and more valuable to the person, than a life of a non-personal being to that 
being.”9 Ernest Partridge also claims that persons possess more rights than non-persons, because 
they are capable of understanding and exercising those rights. Beings are “accorded such rights 
as they have the capacity to exercise.”10 
Partridge identifies human as “a biological category” and person “as a moral category.” 
None of the capacities required for personhood demand that a person be a particular species. An 
animal could be a person, as could a human, as long as they possess the necessary characteristics. 
It is a contingent fact that these capacities “are possessed by most members of the species homo 
sapiens, and, to the best of our knowledge, by no other animals in a remotely comparable degree 
and kind.”11Animals lack the necessary cognitive abilities, and cannot claim rights, uphold the 
rights of others, understand or participate in a moral world. The personhood account claims that 
because animals do not exhibit the necessary attributes for personhood, they are excluded from 
the rights which only persons, humans, can understand.  
Kant is another proponent of the personhood account. He frames it differently, saying 
that persons are rational, and self-aware.12 Non-persons, or “things” as he calls them, have only 
conditional worth, because they have no sense of self, and no rationality. “If the inclination and 
the wants founded on them did not exist, then their object would be without value.”13  Rather, 
because they cannot understand and value themselves, and that non-persons can only derive 
value from the appreciation of rational beings.14 He claims that we only have direct duties to 
persons, because they are the only ones capable of claiming a right which others are obliged to 
respect.15 Non-persons can only receive moral attention insofar as persons grant them rights, 
which means that persons have only indirect duties toward them. Indirect duties do not stem 
from the moral worth of the non-persons, but rather out of respect for persons, who demand 
rights on the non-persons’ behalf. Humans have the necessary qualities to be persons, while 
animals lack them. Therefore animals do not have value in of themselves, and are only valuable 
if humans value them. 
It is relatively easy to imagine how the cognitive abilities, or personhood, of most 
humans could ground a moral status that no animal possesses. In the case of Partridge, it is due to 
the lesser value of the lives of non-persons, and that they can only intelligibly possess those 
rights which they are capable of exercising. In the case of Kant, nonpersons have value only if 
they are valuable to persons, and cannot ever be direct rights bearers themselves. Both consider 
humans alone to be persons. Therefore, the personhood account provides an initial basis for our 
intuition that humans warrant greater moral attention.  
                                                
8 Partridge, Ernest. "On the Rights of Animals and of Persons." Thesis. University of California, 
Riverside. The Online Gadfly. 
9 Partridge. 
10 Partridge. 
11 Partridge. 
12 Kant, Immanuel. Page 63. "Rational Beings Alone Have Moral Worth." Environmental Ethics: 
Readings in Theory and Application. By Louis P. Pojman and Paul Pojman. Belmont, CA: Thomson 
Wadsworth, 2008.  
13 Kant, page 63. 
14 Kant, page 63. 
15 Kant, page 64. 
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This account does not, however, supply a solution to the inconsistency in the case of the 
marginals. Humans and animals possess cognitive capacities in a continuum; some human 
properties overlap with animal properties. When drawing the line in cognitive abilities required 
to be a person, we will either include some humans in the animal category, or some animals in 
the human category. It does not give us a basis to justify choosing the basic interests of a 
severely mentally ill human over those of the equally sentient animal. We could either include 
the animal as a person, or include the irrational human in the non-person category, but we cannot 
separate the two in moral worth when they possess the cognitive capacities required for 
personhood in equal measure. Therefore, the personhood account, with either Partridges or 
Kant’s formulation, is insufficient to allow us to prefer the basic interests of all humans over 
those of all animals. 
 
The Utilitarian Account 
One way to understand the moral significance of humans and animals is in terms of the 
amount of universal harm or benefit that will result from fulfilling or denying their interests. 
John Stuart Mill defends this understanding of morality, utilitarianism, which “holds that actions 
are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the 
reverse of happiness.”16 There are detailed accounts of what “ideas it includes in ideas of pain 
and pleasure.” 17 For example, eating too much cake can bring happiness, but gluttony is 
ultimately not a good thing. However, for the purposes of this paper, a cut and dry account will 
suffice: pleasure and fulfillment of interests is good, and suffering and denial of interests is bad.  
Utilitarians could justify our intuition by claiming that only humans feel pleasure and 
pain. That way, there would be nothing wrong or right with any action we take toward animals, 
and we could act toward them in any way we please. As recently as 30 years ago, this argument 
might have held water, as animals’ capacity to suffer physical pain was debated.18 The advent of 
behavioral psychology quickly turned the debate into consensus: we have nearly equal basis for 
believing that animals feel pain as we do for understanding that other humans feel pain, 
particularly with babies who are not capable of language.19 Richard Sarjeant reminds us that 
animals' nervous systems are very much like our own:  
 
[E]very particle of factual evidence supports the contention that the higher 
mammalian vertebrates experience pain sensations at least as acute as our own. 
To say that they feel less because they are lower animals is an absurdity; it can 
easily be shown that many of their senses are far more acute than ours.20 
 
Animals are thought not only to be capable of experiencing physical pain, but also more 
complex suffering, like emotional pain. There may not be a “single method which, by itself, can 
tell us about the emotional experiences that animals might have,” but through a “synthesis of the 
pictures given by all methods,” we can at the very least understand that animals cannot be 
                                                
16 Mill, John Stuart., and Alexander Dunlop. Lindsay. Page 6. Utilitarianism ; Liberty ; and 
Representative Government. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1951. 
17 Mill, page 6. 
18 Dawkins, Marian Stamp. Page 3. Animal Suffering: the Science of Animal Welfare. London: Chapman 
and Hall, 1980. 
19 Dawkins, page 3. 
20 Richard Sarjeant. Page 72. The Spectrum of Pain. (London: Hart Davis, 1969). 
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excluded from the utilitarian calculations described thus far without being speciesist. Certainly, 
humans are not the only beings capable of experiencing pleasure and pain. 
Therefore, I accept Singer’s expansion of the utilitarian theory, which demands that 
animal pain and pleasure be considered. Singer asserts that, “[I]f a being suffers, there can be no 
moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration,” because “the capacity to 
suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness [ ] is the only defensible boundary of concern for 
the interests of others.”21   
The capacity for suffering or happiness is the vital characteristic that gives a being the 
right to moral consideration: “to say that creatures possess equal moral standing is to say that the 
moral significance of comparably serious harms and benefits to these creatures is the same.”22 
For the basic interests of a human and an animal to have the same moral weight, they would have 
to benefit or suffer equally from the fulfillment or betrayal of their interests. 
If animals and humans suffer, and their suffering is all that is necessary to give their 
interests moral weight, then we cannot clearly say that all basic human interests are more morally 
significant that all basic animal interests. Sometimes, basic human interests will outweigh those 
of animals, and other times, basic animal interests will outweigh those of humans, depending on 
the amount of harm or benefit they bring about in the world. How, then, can those who hold a 
utilitarian account of moral standing keep all basic human interests above all basic animal 
interests?  
Those utilitarians who wish to draw a distinction between human and animal interests no 
longer argue over whether or not animals are capable of suffering physical pain. Rather than 
saying “they do not suffer,” they claim that they “do not suffer as humans do,” or they cannot 
experience pleasure as humans do. Beings are morally considerable based upon the degree to 
which they are capable of experiencing pleasure and pain. If animals are not capable of suffering 
and happiness to the same degree as humans, then though they possess the necessary property to 
be morally considerable, their basic interests will always be subordinate to those of humans. 
Then our intuition will be justified.   
Claiming to measure the experiences of humans and animals might at first seem 
problematic due to simple truths about assessing agony. Pleasure and pain are “difficult to study 
because of one unavoidable property: they are essentially private”.23  It is hard to prove that the 
rabies shot I receive hurts me less than it hurts an animal. It is also hard to determine if the 
separation anxiety a dog displays when separated from its human owners is greater or less than 
the amount I miss my family when they are gone.  
But the definition of suffering that utilitarians can call upon does not rely upon animals 
being less sensitive to physical or emotional pain. The claim is that the human mental life will 
compound whatever physical pain they might experience, and this makes human suffering 
greater than any animal could ever experience. Also, the human mental life allows for higher 
kinds of pleasure than animals could ever experience. The betrayal of basic interests may be 
absolutely equal between a human and an animal, or even greater for the animal. But because of 
the unique human ability to think about our situation, the human will suffer more in receiving the 
                                                
21 Singer, Peter. Page 571.  "All Animals Are Equal." Bioethics: an Anthology. By Helga Kuhse and Peter 
Singer. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2006. 
22 Christopher Knapp. Page 175. "Species Inegalitarianism as a Matter of Principle." Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 26.2 (2009). 
23 Dawkins, page 11. 
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same treatment. Our intuition could be justified by the greater harm or benefit humans can 
experience because of the mental capacities that they have and animals lack.  
There are different descriptions of exactly which traits humans possess that give them the 
capacity to suffer more by a betrayal of their basic interests. Proposed qualifications to have the 
human-level of moral weight include “having desires for the future,” a “continuous mental 
existence,” and “an understanding of what it is to exist over a period of time.”24  Also proposed 
are the human capacity for enrichment, memories, fear of the future, self-consciousness, and 
complex goals.25  
Mill believes that human cognitive capacities allow them significantly greater potential 
for happiness. He assigns “the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of 
the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation.”26 When 
save an animals’ life, we allow it to continue to enjoy beastly pleasures. When we save a 
human’s life, when she has so much more potential for enrichment and self-fulfillment, it results 
in much greater benefit for the individual and the world. Humans can strive for self-
improvement; they can choose a life path and actively follow it, then find fulfillment from the 
completion of their goals. Animals, on the other hand, will benefit if their basic interests are met, 
but do not break the mold of instinctual living. A human has vast opportunities when leading a 
healthy life. If we had to choose between taking the leg of a human or a cow, we could consider 
the benefit that having all legs would yield to each. If the cow is permitted to keep its leg, it will 
be able to walk or run, and stand when giving milk. If a human is permitted to keep his or her 
leg, he or she will be able to play sports, mountain climb, walk his daughter down the aisle, 
dance, get on and off trains, and a plethora of other activities which can contribute to an 
enriching and adventurous life. The potential benefit is therefore clearly larger for the human, so 
we should prefer his or her basic interests, and take the leg of the cow instead.  
Peter Carruthers calls the idea of animal suffering being equated with human suffering 
“intuitively abhorrent” based upon the disparities in the properties humans and animals possess.  
To illuminate this view, we can look at a specific example of how the human mental life might 
always result in greater suffering: suppose that a human went through life, without reflection, 
spending it working as a slave. This is comparable to the way a pack animal might live its life, 
and so we might be tempted to say that their suffering is the same, and that the servitude is 
equally bad in both cases. However, the human is capable of reflecting upon his or her life, 
whether or not he or she actually does so, and feeling “misery, frustration, and the sense of a life 
wasted.” 27 This requires the ability to reflect and remember different stages of his or her life. 
The idea, more generally, is that humans not only experience pain, but they also anticipate it, 
know it is coming, and suffer in fear of it. Then later, they suffer the memory of it, and for the 
opportunity cost of what they can imagine could have been. The awareness that you will get your 
leg amputated tomorrow is a type of anxiety an animal could not comprehend. After the pain is 
over, humans can also probably remember it more distinctly, and understand exactly what they 
are missing out on because of their handica The animal would not be able to remember all the ills 
that had befallen it, consider an alternative life, or mourn for things not having been otherwise. 
                                                
24 Francione, Gary L. "Animal Rights Theory and Utilitarianism: Relative Normative Guidance." Cal Poly 
College of Liberal Arts.  
25 Leahy, Michael P. Page 152-162. Against Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective. London U.a.: 
Routledge, 1991. 
26 Mill, page 7. 
27 Leahy, page 196. 
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In the case of servitude or an amputation, the animal will suffer the pain in the moment, but will 
not suffer the mental trauma of mourning the life they could have had if things were different. It 
is Singer’s principle of equality that a being’s “suffering be counted equally with the like 
suffering—in so far as rough comparisons can be made—of any other being.”28  If we accept that 
humans always suffer more than animals, we can determine that basic humans always command 
greater consideration than basic animal interests. 
In terms justifying our initial intuition, it is not clear that we can definitively say that the 
cognitive faculties like those of most humans result in greater suffering from betrayed interests, 
or greater benefit from the actualization of interests, than those faculties possessed by a great 
ape. Though comparisons may be rough, it is questionable whether the suffering of animals has 
been given due credit. It is true that some suffering is beyond animals: they will not be 
disappointed by the election this year, or be able to fear what we can tell them is coming. But 
isn’t it plausible that greater anxiety comes from a dog not knowing exactly why he is being 
taken to the vet? Animals certainly appear to experience a great deal of anxiety when forced to 
reencounter traumatic places, which might indicate that they remember their past experiences. 
Perhaps primitive brains are more fear-wracked and engulfed in suffering because they lack the 
ability to imagine a future after the pain they experience. We could plausibly say that greater 
intellect results in the ability to rationalize suffering, and have hope for the future, while a 
primitive intellect will have no such salvation.  
 However, even assuming that the utilitarian account of how cognitive abilities increase 
suffering and benefit are accurate, the reasoning utilized does not elevate the basic interests of all 
individual humans above those of all individual animals, as is the desired result. The utilitarian 
account has a similar flaw to the personhood account: cognitive ability of the individual in 
question is a requirement for moral worth. Unlike the personhood account, cognitive properties 
are not directly being used to assign moral worth. Rather, they are used to increase or decrease 
the morally relevant characteristic: a being’s capacity for suffering.  Making cognitive faculties 
such as memory and intellect requirements for possessing morally weighty interests will result in 
huge disparities between humans. This may be acceptable in of itself, but more importantly, it 
puts many humans on par with some animals with regard to their moral consider ability.  
Young humans and the mentally ill are often not capable of fearing impending pain, and 
are not more capable of remembering it than some animals. Therefore, using a mentally ill 
person to test cosmetics would be no more wrong than using a dog for the same end. The 
utilitarian view would not support either action, because cosmetics products do not create enough 
“good” to make up for the ill enacted. However, if laboratories kept mentally ill people in cages 
to test new cancer treatments in the same way that they currently use monkeys, it might be 
difficult on the utilitarian view to describe the moral wrongness of either action. More 
importantly for this paper, it would be difficult if not impossible for a utilitarian to describe any 
difference in wrongness between what is being done to the human and the monkey.  It would be 
inconsistent treatment to say that the basic interests of all humans are more important than the 
basic interests of all animals. 
There is, however, a level of consideration we can offer human babies and children on 
the utilitarian account. Singer challenges: “would the experimenter be prepared to perform his 
experiment on an orphaned human infant, if that were the only way to save many lives? …If the 
experimenter is not prepared to use an orphaned human infant, then his readiness to use 
                                                
28 Singer (2006), page 569 
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nonhumans is simple discrimination.”29 This same point made by Singer would make sense if he 
was talking about a mentally ill orphan, but healthy human babies come under a different defense 
than mentally ill people. Human children and babies, the utilitarian could argue, can have the 
same amount of wrong done to them as an average human adult. Though they lack mental 
capabilities at the moment, they have greater potential than any animal, and stunting them from 
achieving that potential by betraying their basic interests is more wrong than any action one 
could take against an animal.30 No animal has the same potential to lead a fulfilling life on 
mental, physical and spiritual levels as a human baby.  
Yet, the utilitarian cannot account for the moral value of cognitively challenged humans, 
and does not ensure the value of all humans over all animals. We cannot claim that the basic 
interests of all humans should be preferred over the basic interests of all animals without 
inconsistency in the utilitarian account.   
 
The Rights Account 
The rights account of the moral superiority of humans defines a distinction between 
rights and interests: rights are moral claims, while interests are wants with no morality attached. 
If a being possesses a right, that right warrants some level of moral attention. Beings have moral 
claims to their rights, which others must respect and ought not to violate without sufficient 
grounds.31  An interest, on the other hand, carries no moral requirement. I may be interested in 
owning my neighbor’s car, but he certainly has no obligation to give it to me, or even to let me 
borrow it. I cannot make any moral claim regarding my interest; it is simply my desire or will, 
and it is impossible for my neighbor to wrong me by ignoring it. However, since I have a right to 
my own property, my neighbor should give the lawn mower he borrowed back to me. He 
shouldn’t keep it, or damage it, and he would wrong me if he does either. 
Cohen justifies our intuition by distinguishing which beings are capable of having rights. 
He thinks humans have interests and rights, such as the right to life. He argues that animals do 
not have rights, and have only interests. Therefore, in Cohen’s view, humans are morally 
significant in a way that animals are not: humans have certain rights which must be respected, 
while animals cannot be “wronged” because they don’t have rights which can be violated.32 
Animals are not moral agents at all: they can neither do something morally wrong, nor have 
something morally wrong done to them.  
To align this formulation of rights and interests with our feelings, Cohen reminds us of 
the natural order and predation. If people see a baby zebra being killed by a lion, they will not 
feel morally obligated to step in. In the natural world, without humans, beings have only 
interests, not rights. The lion is not committing any moral wrong, and no matter how grotesque 
the hunt, it is simply natural predation. However, if people see a lion hunting a human baby, they 
would certainly intervene, as “the human baby has the right not to be eaten.”33 This example is 
supposed to reveal our instincts that animals, even cute baby zebras, cannot have right or wrong 
done to them.34 
                                                
29 Singer (2006), page 573. 
30 Leahy, page 205. 
31 Cohen, Carl, and Tom Regan. Page 17. The Animal Rights Debate. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2001. 
32 Cohen and Regan, page 18.  
33 Cohen and Regan, page 30. 
34 Cohen and Regan, page 30. 
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Why is it necessary for animals to understand moral significance in order for them to 
possess morally significant interests? To have rights is to be a moral agent, and “to be a moral 
agent is to be able to grasp the generality of moral restrictions on our will”.35 Cohen claims that 
the concept of right only applies to beings which understand moral requirements, and therefore 
animals are wholly excluded. Animals do not know that any conduct is right or wrong in a moral 
sense. The capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong is uniquely human.  
Since we live in a moral community, which Cohen says is uniquely human, we have laws 
which officially acknowledge certain universal rights of humans’. Animals have made no such 
moral agreements in a moral community. They do not possess the power to demand a right in our 
community, and they would lack the ability to invoke or wave a right if we created one for them 
in our legal structure. This is not due to a lack of an ability to communicate, but to a fundamental 
disparity in the understanding humans and animals are capable of.  Cohen explains that “the 
concept of a right cannot possibly apply to” animals, because the “concept of a right is 
essentially human”.36 He claims it is not intelligible to say that animals possess any rights.  
Cohen gives us a specific example: “Humans are capable of moral choice; therefore, 
humans must choose to allow themselves to be instruments of scientific research…this consent 
that we think absolutely essential in the case of human subjects is impossible for animals to 
give,” because they “cannot understand possessing moral authority over their own bodies.”37 
When a scientist wants to perform tests on a human subject, he may not do so without the 
human’s consent, both because of the standards of the moral community, and the individual’s 
ability to invoke them. Animals fall short when it comes to community, and the ability to invoke 
rights. Thus, Cohen can say that our intuition is accounted for, because the basic interests of 
humans will be protected by their rights, and we do not owe animals any similar consideration.  
Though Cohen’s example does shows that animals cannot claim the right to decide 
whether they are used in scientific experiments while some humans can, it does not show us that 
all humans can.  If Cohen’s argument for what it takes to possess a right consisted in the 
understanding of morality alone, animals and humans who don’t understand moral stewardship 
of their bodies would not have a right over their own bodies. Not all humans fulfill the qualities 
which Cohen deems necessary to be a rights bearer. Some humans cannot understand the moral 
implications of rights for themselves or others, and they cannot participate in the moral realm of 
rights any more than animals. Also, not all humans are necessarily member of a moral 
community: they could be a member of a community with laws that grant rights to some 
members of society exclusively (such as the Caste system), or they could be socially isolated. It 
would seem, then, that some humans would not be able to claim rights any more than an animal.  
Here, Cohen introduces a second argument, the Argument from Kinds, which is meant to 
dispel concerns that only some humans are rights-bearers on the rights account. The conclusion 
of this argument is intended to allow humans who do not have the necessary characteristics to 
possess rights to be rights bearers, without broadening the necessary characteristics to include 
any animals. If successful, Cohen would successfully answer our intuition, and avoid the 
inconsistency other accounts fall prey to, which Singer blames on speciesism.  
Cohen states that all humans have rights because humans are the kind of thing to which 
rights obtain, while “animals are of such a kind that rights never pertain to them.”38 He believes 
                                                
35 Cohen and Regan, 35. 
36 Cohen and Regan, pages 29-30. 
37 Cohen and Regan, page 37. 
38 Cohen and Regan, page 37. 
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that the criticism that some humans may lose or not possess the necessary characteristics to 
receive rights “mistakenly treats the essentially moral feature of humanity as though it were a 
screen for sorting humans, which it most certainly is not.”39 Cohen believes this because 
“humans are of such a kind that rights pertain to them as humans; humans live lives that will be, 
or have been, or remain essentially moral.”40 He thinks it is ridiculous to suppose that a failure of 
health could exclude some humans from their place in the moral realm, when rights only exist 
due to humans and their moral community. Individual humans cannot lose the moral 
consideration warranted to their kind just because they are personally not capable rights bearers. 
Animals are the kind of being which can never possess a right. Thus, the argument of Kinds 
separates all humans from all animals, even the marginal cases.  
Jeff McMahan objects to Cohen’s argument of Kinds in several ways. Cohen wants to 
extend rights to all humans by using strange tool, “kinds.” McMahan illustrates the main 
problem with kinds: “the morally significant properties characteristic of a kind do not get to be a 
part of an individual’s nature simply because that individual possesses the closely but 
contingently correlated properties that are essential to membership in the kind.”41 Cohen wants to 
say that morality is essentially human, but clearly, the characteristics that we are addressing do 
not define humanity. The ability to understand morality is not required to be human. If it were, 
then those people who do not possess moral understanding would not be human at all. Human 
DNA is a property which is strongly correlated with moral understanding, but that doesn’t mean 
that the rights entailed by moral understanding can be extended to those who don’t have it, just 
because they also have human DNA. Since the features Cohen wants to call essentially human 
are not, in fact, required to be human, he cannot claim that resulting moral prize, rights, are 
universally human.42 
If however, one accepts the logic of kinds, it is not clear where the argument can and 
cannot be applied. If ordinary members of a particular kind have property B, then all members of 
that kind warrant the moral consideration demanded by B. Many assignments of rights, or 
judgments, are based upon the degree to which one has a particular characteristic. But if we 
ignore the individual and default to and individual’s “kind” to determine their moral status, 
moral considerations for the individual will be based upon their grou  
Let’s assume that the argument from Kinds is in the right, and that men are smarter than 
women on average.43 The difference between men and woman may be slight, but it is still there. 
Consequently, an individual man will receive whatever moral consideration is warranted to more 
intelligent people, because he is of that kind. If two people apply for a spot a top college, it is 
safe to assume that the smarter, more qualified individual should be granted entry. With these 
assumptions, if a dimwitted man and an intelligent woman applied for the same spot at a top 
college, the man should be accepted over the woman, because men are of the kind which is 
smarter. The individual man must be included in the moral consideration given to his kind, 
regardless of his personal characteristics. The women cannot rise above the moral consideration 
of her kind, even though she possesses the properties which would seem to make her the better 
                                                
39 Cohen and Regan, page 37. 
40 Cohen and Regan, page 37. 
41 Jeff McMahan. Page 358. “Our Fellow Creatures”. Journal of Ethics. Volume 9 (3-4), 2005.  
42 McMahan, page 358.  
43 After all, gender could easily be kind category as well. Cohen cannot claim that “kinds” only apply to 
different species, because that would be speciesist.  
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choice for higher education. This is sexist, and seems to be against our moral intuition, but if we 
believe in the logic that Cohen wants us to accept, it follows.   
The argument from kinds is appealing because it “levels up’’ certain members of our 
species, giving them a status equivalent to our own and higher than that of the members of other 
species.”44 But the same logic which allows us to level beings up also requires the possibility of 
“leveling down.”45 McMahan illustrates the problem with the example of original sin. We can 
assume, as some theologians do, that if one has original sin, one should be sent to Hell, and that 
all humans have original sin. Therefore, we can determine that humans are of the kind that has 
original sin. If a human happened to be born without sin, she should still be sent to Hell. The 
status conferring property which her kind has, though she as an individual lacks it, still dictates 
the moral ramifications she should face. This is contrary to our current individualistic moral 
understanding. If a wildly intelligent ape emerged from the jungle, and had moral understanding 
rivaling a professor of ethics, scientists would be justified in taking the ape to a lab to perform 
cancer research on it. Even though this ape has the characteristics which Cohen deems necessary 
to have rights, it is of a kind which only has interests, and is therefore not capable of being 
wronged. Thus, the argument from Kinds results in consequences which are far too troubling for 
it to salvage the inconsistency of the rights account.  
I reject personhood accounts, utilitarianism, and rights-based accounts as possible ways 
of justifying our intuitions regarding the moral status of animals. I propose, though it requires 
expansion beyond this paper, social contract theory as a legitimate position from which to prefer 
the interests of humans against those of animals.  
 
Justifying our Intuitions through Rawls’ Social Contract Theory 
I propose social contract theory as a legitimate position from which to prefer the interests 
of humans over those of animals. The social contract theory I will introduce for this purpose is 
Rawlsian contractualism.  
Rawls’ project is meant to give us a tool to access principles of justice. Rawls provides a 
thought experiment to allow us to discover justice through an imaginary social contract.46 We 
can use this thought experiment to understand what just treatment between people is. Rawls then 
intends us to model social institutions, like laws and other social contracts, after it.  
In his thought experiment, Rawls wants to discover a just contract, which will reveal fair 
treatment and what each of us is due. To do this, he simplifies the world to an idealized society 
made up of people he calls “citizens.” Unlike in the real world, human citizens are the only 
potential subjects of direct duties. Other beings with interests that could potentially be morally 
significant, such as animals or plants, are not mentioned. Rawls requires two moral powers of the 
citizens: citizens must have a “sense of justice” and “the capacity for a conception of the 
good.”47 These two powers give them the desire to find the good and the ability to contract.  
But if all of the citizens got together and tried to create a contract to run their society, 
they would not make a fair one. Citizens would be swayed by all kinds of morally irrelevant 
factors. Those who are more powerful and forceful would be more likely to get their way, and 
                                                
44 McMahan, page 358. 
45 McMahan, page 358. 
46 He is not claiming that contracts create morality.  
47 Freeman, Samuel, "Original Position", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/original-position/>. 
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those who were weak would be more likely to be ignored.48 They would all be swayed by their 
particular philosophy and conception of the good, and the contract they created would not bring 
out the true principles of justice, which Rawls believes are based in fairness.49 
Therefore, Rawls maintains that the citizens must create their contract from behind the 
veil of ignorance, where they will not know the particular details of their actual lives. He uses 
this set-up because he believes that citizens do not, in a morally relevant sense, deserve their 
particular intellect, wealth, health, race, gender, philosophy etc. When these morally irrelevant 
details are stripped from a person she is in what Rawls calls the original position. Each 
contractor in the original position will become a citizen when the veil is lifted, but has no 
knowledge of what his or her identity will be. 50  
The qualities that a contractor must have in order to create a contract that reflects justice 
are freedom, “in the sense that they are able to press claims on each other,” equality, as in “each 
can make proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on,” and independence, in that 
“they are mutually disinterested” concerning the interests of other contractors.51 These 
characteristics will not be stripped from a citizen when she is behind the veil.  
Given the possibility that they could be anybody, contractors will endeavor to make a 
contract that is fair to all people, and will not undercut any member of society. Their choices will 
not be motivated by “sympathy or by envy, but rather each by a desire to do as well for himself 
as he can.”52 Rawls assumes that the contractors understand how to attain what they want, and 
therefore the rules they agree upon will ensure fairness. Rawls believes that ideas about justice in 
this ideal situation will converge, and much of his project is devoted to discovering that 
convergence. After all, everyone will want exactly the same thing: to do as well for himself as he 
can despite the lack of knowledge concerning personal identity.53 
It might seem, however, that not knowing what one’s conception of the good is might 
make it difficult to create any sort of agreement from the original position. Rawls believes there 
are good things that one would hope for regardless of his or her identity, such as health, income, 
liberty, powers, rights, a chance for self-respect, and opportunities.54 These are good things 
which can be achieved through societal structures and agreements, which gives the contractors 
incentive to create a just contract these institutions can be modeled after.  
The convergence on most matters the contractors would discuss is not important for this 
paper. Surely some of these issues would be more difficult than others: for example, it is difficult 
to imagine whether the contractors would agree that abortion is right or wrong, because it is 
unclear if a contractor could in actuality become the aborted citizen. This and other issues would 
be difficult to imagine from the original position because of our personal philosophies on moral 
issues.55 However, I posit that the contractors in Rawls’ ideal society would agree that the basic 
                                                
48 Rawls, John. Page 136-137. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 1971. 
49 Rawls, page 141. 
50 Rawls, page 137-141. 
51 Cureton, Adam. Page 14. "A Rawlsian Perspective on Justice for the Disabled," Essays in Philosophy: 
Vol. 9: Iss. 1, Article 5. 2008. 
52 Scanlon Jr., Thomas M. Page 1023. "Rawl's Theory of Justice." HeinOnline. University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 1972-1973. <http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=psbasic>. 
53 Rawls, page 140. 
54 Scanlon, page 1023. 
55 I am going to assume that Rawls can respond to critics of the social contract theory, and generally can 
defend it as a tool for discovering just principles, and what beings are owed.  
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interests of the citizens they will become should be preferred to those beings with interests which 
are not party to the contract. In Rawls’ ideal society, and, as I will discuss more fully later, in the 
real world, animals cannot be contractors.  
Regan levels a criticism against Rawlsian contractualism, saying: “Contractarianism56 
could be a hard view to refute when it comes to the moral status of animals if it was an adequate 
theoretical approach to the moral status of human beings”  He challenges contractualism in the 
same manner as I have challenged many other theories attempting to exclude animals. He claims 
that Rawlsian contractualism “systematically denies that we have direct duties to those human 
beings who do not have a sense of justice – young children, for instance, and many mentally 
retarded humans.”57  Direct duties would be those which we owe to the children and the mentally 
challenged themselves, whereas indirect duties would be those duties which we perform for these 
groups, but not due to their own moral weight or respect for their interests.  
Since Rawls’ rational, free, and moral citizens are the only ones included in the contract 
he discusses, Regan accuses Rawls of denying that we have direct duties to marginal cases. He 
claims that Rawls’ account leaves only indirect consideration for those humans who do not meet 
the qualifications to be citizens. Regan correctly finds fault with indirect duty views: something 
seems wrong if I can punch a child without wronging him or her, and instead only wrong those 
rational beings who are party to the contract and care for the child’s welfare. If Rawlsian 
contractualism excludes marginal cases in the way Regan describes, we would grant babies 
moral consideration due to rational contractors who are concerned for the wellbeing of children, 
and include their interests in the contract. We would not give any moral weight to the children 
themselves. 
However, Regan’s criticism is not crafted against Rawls’ intended project. Rawls says: “I 
put aside for the time being these temporary disabilities and also permanent disabilities or mental 
disorders so severe as to prevent people from being cooperative members of society in the usual 
sense.”58  The world Rawls describes for his thought experiment does not include cognitively 
disabled people, much less animals, as potential contractors. Rawls never meant to account for 
the real world and just principles in it, so his exclusion of marginal cases is not intended to be 
mirrored in a world which contains them. Rawls isn’t even talking about ordinary people in our 
world: his project concerns idealized citizens in a single ideal society. Rawls “directs us to 
supplement and qualify the limited project when we set out to find principles of justice for a 
society like ours.”59 Modifying the nonessential features and the perfection of the world Rawls is 
describing in A Theory of Justice to give it qualities like our own, we can use Rawls’ ingenious 
tool in our world. We can imagine the beings of our world creating a contract behind the veil of 
ignorance, and discover what each is justly due. 
The pertinent feature of justice that Rawls focuses on is justice as fairness. He thinks that 
we ought to make moral decisions regarding the treatment of other humans as if we were all 
rational and just beings, ignorant of our personal identities.60 He encourages us to imagine that 
                                                
56 Although many characterize Rawls’ theory as contractualism rather than contractarianism, the 
differences between them are not important for this paper. Regan describes Rawls’ theory as 
contractarian, but his challenge has nothing to do with the changes in terminology.  
57 Regan, Tom. Page 78. "Duties to Animals: Rawl's Dilemma," Ethics and Animals: Vol. 2: Iss. 4, Article 
4, 1981. 
58 Rawls quoted in Cureton, page 15.  
59 Cureton, page 6. 
60 Friend, Celeste. "Social Contract Theory." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
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upon completing the contract, our worst enemy would assign us our role in the world, because it 
tests our contract’s consideration for the lowliest members of society.61 These are important 
features of Rawls’ thought experiment, which will carry through to a thought experiment about 
our world.  
In the real world, there would be more possibilities for personal identities than Rawls 
himself puts forth. He discusses identities that differ in matters such as one’s conception of the 
good, and race, whereas we must consider people who have no conception of the good at all, 
who resemble vegetables more than rational citizens. However, just as in the contract of Rawls 
ideal society, the characteristics of the citizens do not match up with the characteristics of the 
contractors. “The original position is a purely hypothetical device” where “there is no 
presumption…that the characteristics of the parties in the original position must be the same as 
the features of the citizens for whom the principles are chosen.”62 Even though young children 
lack the rationality that Rawls deems essential for contract making, this does not mean that they 
will also lack rationality and the ability to act as contractors in the original position.   
However, if the characteristics that a being has in reality indiscriminately fail to match up 
with the characteristics of its corresponding contractor, all beings with interests could potentially 
participate in the social contract.63 We could assign trees contractors to defend their interests 
from the original position, with all of the necessary characteristics of freedom, equality, and 
independence. Even though trees themselves lack these characteristics, they could still demand 
rights with humans from the original position. Anything with a conceivable interest could get to 
stake their claims in the contract. When the veil is lifted, we would have to consider those claims 
that were accepted by all contractors as the tenants of justice. If contractors were revealed to be 
representing animals, plants, and trees, we would have direct duties to them like we do to human 
contractors. Animal’s basic interests would surely be equal to those of humans if they could 
contract as equals. How do we know which beings can make claims in the contract? 
I propose that in order to be able to participate in the social contract, a being must be 
capable of participating in the social contract from its own original position. The qualifications 
for one to be capable of being a contractor are rationality, independence, equality, and freedom. 
Admission into the contract is having these characteristics when stripped64 of life stage, defect, 
                                                
61 Freeman 
62 Cureton, page 12. 
63 It would be speciesist to say that only humans can participate in the contract. Any being that has 
interests may possibly have rights, regardless of species.  
Rawls’ veil of ignorance removes particular knowledge of morally irrelevant features of the citizens in 
order to prevent them from altering the contract in unjust ways in order to grant themselves rights they 
aren’t truly owed (such as a rich man trying to get better terms for rich men in the contract). One of the 
modifications of his project that is important for our world is not to remove knowledge of morally 
irrelevant features from the contractors, but rather to remove morally irrelevant features from the 
contractors. This is just as easy to imagine, and allows beings with full life stories to receive just 
consideration in more plausible ways. I will give two examples in Rawls’ ideal account to describe the 
importance of this modification: Even ideal citizens will be babies at some point, but Rawls does not 
discuss the justice owed to citizens when they are very young. All people will lack moral understanding 
when they are infants, yet it would be troublesome for us to say that infants are not recipients of justice. 
Even if an infant dies, and never has moral understanding, we want to be able to say that it was still a 
recipient of justice. But infants cannot be capable contractors behind the veil of ignorance if the 
knowledge of their age is all we remove; not knowing that one is a baby will not allow one moral powers 
that one is capable of only after infancy. However, removing infancy from the equation, citizens will have 
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and other morally irrelevant details, such as religion, personal philosophy, gender, and economic 
status.65 A contractor will have the necessary characteristics for contracting when all disease, age 
related impairments, accidents, and misfortunes are no longer hindering them.  
How does this principle pick out humans, but not animals and other beings with interests? 
A tree, when stripped of its particular characteristics such as its particular leaf shape, size, broken 
branches and age, will not be able to contract. So, when using our tool for determining justice, 
we would not consider the submissions of a tree in the original position for inclusion in our 
contract. Quite simply, there would be none; the tree in the original position does not have the 
necessary attributes to uphold promises or claim rights in a contract. Therefore, when we are 
modeling our actual laws and actual social contracts after the contract created in the original 
position, there is no need to imagine that trees have rights, or that we have direct duties toward 
them.  
An individual animal, free from accidents, could also not imaginably participate in a 
contract. Animals lack the ability to make and uphold promises, the understanding to demand 
rights, and the desire to seek justice. Never has an animal demonstrated the level of rationality 
and moral understanding required to be capable of participating in a contract. However, Singer 
questions: “if it is unfair to take advantage of an isolated defect, why is it fair to take advantage 
of a more general limitation,” such as being an animal?66 The crucial difference between a 
“general limitation” and “defect” is what that means for an individual behind the veil of 
ignorance. Defects are part of a life story which could have been otherwise for an individual, and 
are not morally relevant. Limitations are part of all individual beings and particular things, no 
matter how events unfold. All humans, animals, and rocks have limitations. But it is only those 
things which could have been otherwise for an individual which reflect “the arbitrariness of the 
world,” and must “be corrected for” in the circumstances in which the contract is created.67 An 
individual animal is limited in its cognitive capacities, because no matter the conditions it is 
faced with in life, it will never have moral understanding. When referring to a cat in the original 
position, where it is free from accidents or particular features, such as a love of tuna or dislike of 
vets, it would not be capable of contracting. No alternative life story of a cat would result in it 
                                                
the moral understanding that they would have just in case they were not infants, but some other age 
instead. If we remove knowledge, rather than morally irrelevant factors, it seems that people can lose their 
place in the contract in troublingly common situations, because they will still suffer what morally 
irrelevant situations can make them lack. If a sleeping man were thrust behind the veil of ignorance, and 
then knowledge of his sleep were removed, he would not be a capable contractor, because the contractor 
would not gain consciousness. He would merely lose knowledge of whether or not he was asleep in the 
real world, along with knowledge of his gender, political views, age etc. The contractor will not, when he 
loses the knowledge of his state of consciousness, regain the cognitive capacities that were lost when the 
man he is representing went to sleep. But if a sleeping man is not a capable contractor, he is not a 
recipient of justice. It would be far too troubling to claim that when people sleep they are not recipients of 
justice, even if they do not wake up at the end of it. Being asleep is not a morally relevant factor, yet 
removing knowledge of sleep does not remove the restriction sleep places upon one’s cognitive faculties. 
That is why it is essential that we remove sleep from the man behind the veil, rather than just making him 
ignorant of it. This new method of describing the original position follows Rawls’ conception of what 
morally irrelevant features are, and achieves Rawls’ end for the original position: to allow contractors to 
create a contract without being influenced by morally irrelevant factors of their life on earth.  
65 Rawls, page 137. 
66 Singer (2008), page 81. 
67 Rawls, page 141. 
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having the necessary cognitive capacities to contract. If all the beings with interests were behind 
the veil, the contract was made, and then the veil was lifted, no being which was revealed to be 
an animal would have participated in the contract’s creation.  
On the other hand, no human is excluded from participating in the contract in the original 
position. Dementia, youth, fetal alcohol syndrome, head injuries, mental disorders etc. are all 
defects which will be stripped away from individual contractors. Without these defects, 
individual humans of every race, class, gender, and personal identity will be capable of 
understanding and participating in the contract. There is no cognitive or physical disability a 
human can be stricken with that can result in him or her not being a direct participant in the 
contract. Even if a mentally ill person cannot understand moral rules in reality, from the original 
position, she will not be stricken with disease. Her inability to contract in actuality does not 
change her imaginable participation in the social contract, when details of a life story such as 
mental illness are removed. It is not until the veil is lifted, and the contract is already made, that 
maladies will be inflicted.  
All humans in the original position would be on equal footing when it comes to the 
possibility of disability when our identities are revealed. Every contractor would want to be 
afforded certain rights and decent treatment in the event that they turned out to have dementia. 
Whether or not the actual dementia patient can understand rights or demand them does not affect 
his or her wanting them from the original position. Therefore, our social contract, which in and 
of itself reveals just principles, will no doubt include rights and direct duties for those who are 
not capable of claiming it themselves, including children, the disabled, and socially isolated 
people.68 
One might think, however, that the features we pick to strip away in the original position 
are speciesist. We remove the defects and parts of personal identity, while leaving others 
(rationality, independence etc). With this specific trait removal process, it becomes questionable 
whether the traits selected are legitimate, or whether they are merely traits designed to pick out 
humans and exclude other beings from being contractors. On what grounds can we strip away 
some features, and leave others? To say that a contractor must not be stripped of its species in the 
                                                
68 This is not to say that we have no duties toward animals, or that they have no moral status at all. My 
result would be problematic if it could not provide an explanation for why  people should not torture 
animals for fun. When imagining the contract from the original position, I think contractors would grant 
non-contracting beings with interests some level of moral consideration. Wildness, flora, and fauna 
cannot be owed anything, but they still could be included in the contract. They cannot impose direct 
duties on contractors, but contractors can serve as trustees, and include protection for animal interests in 
the contract. As discussed above, basic interests of active contractors will be respected above interests of 
non-contractors, but puppy skinning will probably not be morally acceptable to rational contractors. If 
contractors include in their contract appropriate treatment of pets, domestic animals, and wild animals, 
these beings will receive some moral consideration indirectly. If we put in the contract that we must not 
kills other’s pets, then pets cannot be killed without wronging another contractor. The pet itself cannot be 
wronged, because it is not promised anything. We also need not worry that animals will achieve equal 
moral status to humans through their trustees: No matter my personal identity, I will want my fellow 
contractors to prefer my interests to those of animals who are not party to the contract. I will want my 
fellow citizens to give me food and shelter before a starving animal in the case that I am poor, to protect 
me from being eaten by starving animals in the case that I am not physically fit, and to allow me to kill 
animals for my own basic interests without legal repercussions. Therefore, it is relatively easy to imagine 
that the basic interests of humans would be preferred to those of animals if humans alone are contracting 
behind the veil of ignorance.   
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original position is to say that species is a morally relevant feature. This claim is speciesist, as 
pointed out by Regan: 
  
To allow that the original contractors know that they will become human beings, 
when they are “incarnated,” is to prejudice the question of who is owed the duty 
of justice in favor of human beings and against animals from the outset. This 
prejudicial backdrop of the original position not only offends against the 
requirement that we be impartial in our assessment of relevant interests; what is 
more, to allow the original contractors to know that they will be human beings but 
not animals runs counter to what the “veil of ignorance” is supposed to 
accomplish. That veil cannot be thick enough if, while denying those in the 
original position knowledge about, for example, what race or sex they will, when 
they come to be in the actual world, it nevertheless allows them to know the 
species to which they will below.69  
 
If I contract considering all personal traits and maladies I could face as defects in the real 
world, it seems that being a different species is not too far a stretch of the imagination. In 
addition to imagining that I could become a person with Down syndrome, I could also contract 
considering the possibility that I could be a horse or a chicken when the veil is lifted.  
From behind the veil, however, these concerns can be allayed: First of all, species will be 
stripped away in the original position. If I am a contractor, it is a safe bet that I will be human 
when the veil is lifted, judging by all evidence of the world we live in thus far. But if it turns out 
when the veil is lifted that I am a super-intelligent animal, the rights I have claimed in the 
contract will still be mine. If we are presented with an animal with the mental capability of an 
ethics professor, we can surely imagine it contracting with humans in our thought experiment.  
If species is a feature which can be stripped away, should contractors attend to the 
possibility that they could be any species when the veil is lifted? If I am a contractor considering 
the possibility that, among other defects and personal identities, I might in fact be a horse or a 
chicken, I am a horse or a chicken that possesses an intellect never before seen in such an animal. 
I could not be contracting if I were an ordinary horse or chicken, because ordinary horses and 
chickens do not possess the necessary characteristics to contract when stripped of defects. If it 
turns out that I am a very intelligent cow, then I am owed exactly what I claimed in the contract 
before I knew my species.  
One might also claim that our conception of defect is speciesist. If we are determining 
that defect is based upon what is expected of a particular kind of being, and the normal features 
of a species, we fall into the same pit as Cohen. But I do not appeal to kind in my account. It is 
not a question of “is this the kind of being which can participate in the social contract from the 
original position,” it is a question of “is this a being which can participate in the social contract 
from the original position.” The original position brings out the potential of the individual life 
when stripped of defect, not about the norm which the being could have been closer to. Defect is 
not matter of deviation from the norm; it is a matter of deviation from what an individual being 
could have been had circumstances been different. With this notion of defect, I avoid the 
problems that the rights view had, of individuals receiving the moral consideration warranted to 
normal members of their grou We are not looking to the norm of a group to determine who is a 
contractor behind the veil; we are looking to individuals and their capacities, and imagining what 
                                                
69 Regan, page 78. 
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they themselves would have been when free from defects. When the veil is lifted, among all of 
the humans could be revealed a super intelligent dog. This dog would then receive the moral 
consideration it would have claimed in the social contract. It will not be evaluated based upon its 
kind, but rather its individual characteristics. 
The claim that “being an animal” is somehow a defect that must be strip away and 
replaced with rationality, freedom etc., is an abuse of our intuition concerning the definition of 
“defect.” No alternate life path for an individual animal would render it a contractor. We can 
point to where a marginal human lost their contracting capability, and how if things had gone 
differently for them, they could have retained it. A child who suffered fetal alcohol syndrome 
might fail to understand promises because it has a defect. We understand that the child would 
have grown up differently, and had the necessary capability, had its mother not drank while it 
was in vitro. Therefore, behind the veil and ignorant of life path, the child can understand 
promises. A dog does not have a defect which renders it incapable of understanding promises. 
Erasing fetal alcohol syndrome from a person’s life story would leave us with a being capable of 
contracting. Removing “dog” from a being’s life story would not.  
For example, let’s imagine twin apes walked out of the jungle, and one had the intellect 
rivaling an ethics professor, and the other acted like an ordinary ape. Due to his mental capacity, 
the first ape would surely be a contractor behind the veil of ignorance, and is owed the 
appropriate moral consideration. If he told us that his twin was of a comparable intellect, and 
contracted a disease, or hit his head, or suffered some other tragedy, his twin would receive the 
same moral consideration. If the details of the twin’s life, save his rationality, freedom, etc., were 
removed, he would be a contractor. It would merely be a surprise when the veil was lifted that he 
was actually an ape, and it is merely a defect of his life that he no longer retains his rationality, 
freedom, etc.  
What status does participation in the contract grant to humans, but not to other beings 
which possess interests? The contract we create in the original position is meant to inform us of 
justice, and the result is that humans are warranted a kind of justice which animals are not. 
Because they are contractors, humans are direct recipients of justice, which are owed things, 
have rights, and are subjects of direct duties. Even if in reality they can’t actively claim or 
understand these things, Rawls thought experiment shows that justice applies directly to all 
contractors. Since humans can directly include their basic interests such as the right to flourish, 
the right to life, rights to their own body, and the right to protect themselves in the contract, these 
interests are warranted by justice. A human will wronged if his or her basic interests are violated, 
while an animal cannot be wronged, because it itself not promised anything by the principles of 
justice. Therefore, we can justify our intuition that the basic interests of humans deserve greater 
consideration than the basic interests of animals through Rawlsian contractualism.  
What does this tell us about how we should treat animals? This paper leaves many 
questions about the appropriate treatment of animals unanswered. For example, for many people, 
it is not a matter of life and death whether or not animals can be used for food or clothing. Since 
this paper only addresses the basic interests of humans and animals, I have made no comment on 
farming animals for food or fashion when it is not essential to human life. Yet, I have taken an 
important step toward the discovery of what the appropriate treatment of animals is, and why 
conduct should be different toward animals when basic interests are in conflict. We can kill 
animals when human lives depend on it, and when humans need essential resources, the interests 
of animals should always be secondary. This is true for all humans and all animals: my account 
avoids inconsistency when treating the basic interests of marginal humans differently than the 
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basic interests of animals. Without first knowing that we can treat the basic interests of all 
humans and all animals differently, we cannot begin to understand the full picture of how 
animals should be treated. 
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